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A decades-long debate has raged globally among academics about how to define
and classify organized crime, its activities, members, and organizing structures.1 This
debate has inspired such interest because organized crime is an intangible concept
with a wide range of activities and criminal capabilities, a diversity of participants,
and different kinds of organizing structures. Law enforcement, however, has been
largely absent from this discussion and is generally reluctant to participate in the
construction of conceptual frameworks intended to strengthen our understanding
of organized crime. Twenty two years ago, Grant Wardlaw (1989: 10) noted that con-
ceptual frameworks are rudimentary in organized crime research. While our crit-
ical understanding of organized crime has evolved significantly, limited progress has
been made in the development of formal models of organized crime and Wardlaw’s
observation remains sadly current.
This article seeks to contribute to the literature of conceptual models of orga-
nized crime through a critique of past theories and the introduction of a hybrid model.
The first part critiques the pluralist-ethnic and bureaucratic-hierarchical models that
have traditionally shaped law enforcement’s conception of organized crime. The se-
cond part outlines the network, market, and enterprise models and then offers a new
hybrid conceptual model. It then explores how this hybrid model can form a theo-
retical framework for a risk assessment methodology on organized crime.
Organized Crime Theoretical Framework
Conceptual models of organized crime are useful because they enable one to think
systematically about the variables involved and, in complex policy situations, the
range of levers that will influence outcomes (Wardlaw, 1989: 10). Law enforcement
officials may be reluctant to participate in or support the construction of concep-
tual models, believing such exercises are too “academic” or outside real police work.
Models that explain organized crime are directly relevant to policing as they guide
how law enforcement collects information and intelligence, targets networks and
individuals, and uses investigative tactics. However, the conceptual models that law
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enforcement uses in relation to organized crime are generally not documented or
articulated publicly (or even internally within law enforcement). More over, Wardlaw
argues that law enforcement’s efforts to counter organized crime are “straight-jack-
eted by a narrow range of relatively unsophisticated concepts which have directed
too much attention at some individuals and some enforcement options” (1989: 13).
Models of organized crime are generally divided into organization-focused and
activity-focused conceptualizations (Cohen, 1977; Halstead, 1998). Some entities
have a corporate or collective identity (e.g., a self-named street gang), while others
may have no sense of common identity (Cohen, 1977: 98). Organization-focused
models concentrate on assessing and classifying the criminal network’s organizing
structures, membership (e.g., the bonds of ethnicity or culture among individuals), in-
ternal dynamics (e.g., systems of organization or governance), and relationship to the
external environment, both licit and illicit (Halstead, 1998: 2). Analysis may focus
on structures of association between actors (e.g., buyer-seller) or networks, and assess
the stability, formation, dissolution, and transformations of associations within and
among criminal organizations (Cohen, 1977: 98).
Given that law enforcement’s conceptual models in relation to organized crime
are generally lacking —if not completely non-existent— clearly it is necessary to
re-examine the assumptions held by police about it. Analysis of organized crime
models demonstrates that many of law enforcement’s assumptions about it can be
traced to specific models (particularly the ethnic-pluralist and bureaucratic-hier-
archical models). These assumptions have persisted, relatively unquestioned by law
enforcement, for decades. However, if law enforcement seeks a more comprehensive
understanding of organized crime and intends to move beyond what Wardlaw calls
“target-of-opportunity enforcement” (1989: 3), then it must re-examine how it views or -
ganized crime.
Activity-focused models target the “what” of organized crime: the illicit and
licit activities undertaken by these criminal organizations and the socio-economic
environment in which they operate. The principles underlying this model are the
inter-connectivity and inter-dependency of the illicit and licit economic sectors,
and that criminals are rational, profit-maximizing actors (Halstead, 1998: 8). Of
course, as van Duyne notes (2000), criminals are people, too, and therefore as likely
as non-criminals to display irrational behavior.
The Godfather Is Dead: The Pluralist-Ethnic Model
The pluralist-ethnic model explains organized crime as comprised of criminal groups
that are relatively “ethnically, racially, or culturally homogeneous” (Mastrofski and
Potter, 1987: 273). The origin of this model is the alien conspiracy model that was
popularized in the early 1950s in the United States to explain what was seen as the
“Italian Mafia.”2 In the pluralist-ethnic model, the conception of organized crime
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2 The alien conspiracy model is also sometimes referred to as the mafia model or the Godfather model.
is broadened from a single ethnicity (Italian) to a focus on multiple ethnicities that
are separated by distinct and relatively rigid boundaries. Organized crime is there-
fore either “a single criminal entity (Cosa Nostra) or [a] body of large criminal
conspiracies (Yakuza, the Triads, the Colombian Cartels, the Cuban Mafia, etc.)”
(Southerland and Potter, 1993: 263). The pluralist model implicitly subscribes to
the theory of “ethnic succession” (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 273) in which suc-
cessive “waves” of ethnically or culturally homogeneous criminal immigrants establish
controlling positions in the criminal marketplace as former criminals move on to
respectability and legitimacy.3 Implicit within the pluralist model is that criminals
are somehow distinct from or outside legitimate society and constitute an exter-
nal threat.4
Many law enforcement agencies around the world implicitly subscribe to the
pluralist-ethnic model. For example, on its website, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation divides its organized crime section along ethnic lines: La Cosa Nostra,
Italian organized crime and racketeering; Eurasian/Middle Eastern organized crime;
and Asian and African criminal enterprises. Law enforcement agencies in Denmark,
Germany, Hungary, and Europol divide organized crime into “ethnic” and “non-
ethnic” groupings (e.g., Danish National Police, 2005; Federal Criminal Police
Office [Germany], 2008; Poczik, 2009; and Europol, 2007). These agencies gen-
erally acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the pluralist-ethnic model, such
as the inability to explain multi-ethnic organizations, but continue to classify orga -
nized crime into broad ethnic categories.  
In Canada, law enforcement’s use of the pluralist-ethnic model is shown in the
reports on organized crime released annually to the public by Criminal Intelli gence
Service Canada (CISC).5 CISC, a national network of law enforcement agencies that
exchanges intelligence on organized crime, has published these reports since 1970
on behalf of the criminal intelligence community. They categorize organized crime
into ethnic or cultural-geographic groupings, such as Aboriginal, Asian, Eastern
European, and Italian organized crime.6 Other groupings (e.g., Indo-Canadian or
Haitian) are added to the model as law enforcement perceives these groupings to
be present in Canada. Street gangs are also categorized by the dominant ethnicity
(e.g., Somali). Canadian-born individuals are not explicitly identified in the model.
Criminal actors that do not conveniently fit under the banner of the ethnic “other,”
such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (predominantly Caucasian in Canada) and Cau -
casian street gangs, form a separate non-ethnic category of networks that are defined
by their ethos (Black, Vander Beken, and De Ruyver, 2000). These criminal entities
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5 See www.cisc.gc.ca.  
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tifiers of the organized crime group; it retains categories for street gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs.
are classified on the basis of their shared distinctive characteristics, parapherna-
lia, and feelings of gang membership.
Not a Criminal Army: The Bureaucratic-Hierarchical Model
The pluralist-ethnic model is typically used in conjunction with the bureaucratic-
hierarchical model that describes a highly formalized, authoritarian structure with
a limited membership, specialized division of labor, and a strict system of rules
and regulations (Abadinsky, 1990: 24). Like the alien conspiracy model, this one
was first and most prominently associated with what was termed the “Italian Ma -
fia” in the United States during the Kefauver Senate Commission of 1950-1951
that investigated organized crime. The bureaucratic-hierarchical model was sub-
sequently broadened to explain organizing structures for other criminal enterprises.
It assumes that criminal networks follow complex operating strategies and have
godfather-like bosses who issue orders down a chain of command to workers (Sout -
herland and Potter, 1993: 263). Organized crime is depicted as a highly orga nized
and strate gically focused criminal army commanded by a mastermind general or
a transnational corporation of evil headed by a brilliant but underworld chief exec-
utive officer. 
The pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models are often referred to collec-
tively as the law enforcement model as it has contributed significantly to how many
law enforcement agencies around the world conceive of organized crime (Souther-
land and Potter, 1993; Beare and Naylor, 1999). Canada, like many other countries,
has been extensively influenced by the law enforcement model, which has been
exported from the United States and assumed to explain organized crime globally.
Critique of the Law Enforcement Model 
The pluralist-ethnic model is flawed as it assumes ethnic or cultural homogeneity
where it often does not exist and is ineffective for categorizing multi-ethnic criminal
networks. The model relies on law enforcement to interpret socio-cultural origins;
however, when investigators or analysts misidentify an individual’s ethnic or cul-
tural/geographic heritage, entire criminal groupings are misclassified. Without com -
mon definitions of terms like “Asian” or “East-European,” there is no consistency
in categorization. An underlying assumption of this model, often made with little
evidence, is that linkages to ethnic homelands remain criminally relevant decades
or even generations after immigration. The model’s narrow focus on the ethnic
“other” overlooks decades of organized criminality undertaken by native-born indi-
viduals. The pluralist model generates racially charged conceptions of organized
crime (i.e., the foreigner as criminal) and distorts the public’s perception of organ-
ized crime to the point that it bears little resemblance to reality (Queensland Crime
Commission, 1999: ix). 
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Ethnicity or cultural/geographic origins can be of some relevance to explain or
contextualize patterns of communication or behavior. For example, individuals of
South Asian origin may use hawalas to transfer funds, and law enforcement must
understand why these informal transfer systems are used both legally and illegally.7
As Morrison notes, “A shared culture, language, and set of values can sometimes
(but not always) increase trust, communication, and, ultimately, the competitive
advantage for some groups” (2002: 3). However, it is important to separate this use
of relevant intelligence from the ineffective use of ethnicity as the “only, or main,
dimension for classification of organized crime groups” (Morrison, 2002: 3).  
The 1950s Kefauver Senate Commission in the United States gave promi-
nence to the alien conspiracy and bureaucratic-hierarchical models. However, the
commission has long been criticized and dismissed as unreliable as it came to its
conclusions on Italian organized crime without independently corroborating the
testimony of its witnesses and informants (Albanese, 1994). Critics condemned
information given to the commission, particularly by its star informant-witness
Joseph Valachi, as riddled with contradictions, factual errors, and incredible, unco -
rroborated assertions (e.g., Albanese, 1985; and Bynum, 1987, quoted in Mastrofski
and Potter, 1987: 274). Pino Arlacchi, a prominent researcher on organized crime,
argues, “Social research into the question of the mafia has probably now reached
the point where we can say that the mafia, as the term is commonly understood, does
not exist” (Arlacchi, 1986, quoted in Naylor, 1995: 54).
The bureaucratic-hierarchal model assumes that organized crime is implicitly
monopolistic, hierarchical, and operates in an authoritarian, rule-bound fashion,
but these assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence. Monopolies are
the exception rather than the rule as the majority of organized criminal networks
tend to be relatively small and loosely structured enterprises without the capacity
for creating and sustaining monopolies (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Southerland
and Potter, 1993; Von Lampe, 2006). Most local criminal networks are also not
controlled by or subservient to larger international hierarchies. The majority of orga -
nized crime in Canada is comprised of loosely structured, competitive networks
with fluid linkages between members and associates and few signs of authorita-
tive leadership (CISC, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). Another flaw in the
bureaucratic-hierarchical model is the kingpin theory which states that targeting
the authoritative leaders of hierarchical organizations should dismantle the organ-
ization. However, the resiliency of many criminal networks after the prosecution
of their “leaders” disputes this assumption (Albanese, 1994; Woodiwiss, 2003; Mas-
trofski and Potter, 1987). 
Despite decades of critiques of the pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical mo -
dels, they have also had considerable influence on the public. One need only think
of movies or television shows like The Godfather, Goodfellas and, more re cently,
the Sopranos and Eastern Promises, to observe how formative these movies have
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been in constructing a particular worldview of organized crime. As an aside, the
author finds that the unfortunately now-cancelled television series Intelligence8
rather accurately depicts organized crime in Vancouver and rejects the dominant
worldview of the pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models. 
“Shifting Coalitions”: Adopting the Network Model
In contrast to the law enforcement model, the network model contends that orga -
nized crime is composed of small, loosely structured networks that are highly reac-
tive to any changes in their environments and adapt quickly to them (Mastrofski
and Potter, 1987: 275). These networks re-group, merge with others, or disband
regularly due to law enforcement intervention, competition, and other pressures
within the criminal marketplace. This model refutes the conception of organized crime
as rigid, hierarchal corporate syndicates each run by a so-called and all-powerful
Mr. Big. Some are family businesses and some rise around a charismatic leader, but
the majority can be depicted as loose associations of people that form, split, and
come together again as opportunity arises with interchangeable positions and fre-
quently with overlapping roles in other criminal enterprises (Paoli, 2002: 67).
In the hostile, competitive environment of the criminal marketplace, criminal
networks need to be capable of rapid innovation and flexibility and to respond to
possible law enforcement intervention, conflict from rivals, and market opportu-
nities (Klerks, 1999: 57). Some organized crime networks remain criminally active
after the imprisonment of leaders or principal members and adapt to the loss of
imprisoned members, or the incarcerated individuals continue to direct or partic-
ipate in illicit activities. Competition, treachery, and disorganization are more com-
mon than strict network discipline, and the fragmented nature of criminal networks
impedes the creation of monopolistic enterprises (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987;
Southerland and Potter, 1993). The high degree of redundancy and duplication in
criminal networks is largely unnecessary in legitimate business but facilitates illicit
networks’ capacity to reconstitute after disruption (Williams and Godson, 2002: 333).
The network model sees organized crime as an “enemy within” rather than an
alien conspiracy of outsiders, of pathological actors who are essentially different
from the normal, law-abiding majority (Edwards and Gill, 2003: 268-269). Orga -
nized crime is “a set of shifting coalitions between groups of gangsters, business-
people, politicians, and union leaders, normally local or regional in scope” (Levi,
2002, cited in Fati, 2004: 150). In this shifting coalition of individuals, it is appar-
ent that some forms of organized crime are symbiotic with the licit marketplace
rather than parasitic. 
The corruption of upper-world figures to facilitate organized crime is not solely
accomplished through coercion: some individuals are willing to be corrupted and
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others seek out opportunities for illicit entrepreneurship. Smith (1980) draws a
parallel between a “corrupter” (organized crime) and a lobbyist (legitimate business)
and notes that the functions are similar: to ensure that regulatory pressures (the le -
gislature, regulatory agencies, and the judiciary) do not interfere unduly with the
client’s operations. While some may feel that this comparison is a bit of a stretch,
it does indicate the consensual nature of much of the corrupting activities that
organized crime undertakes. It also demonstrates the interaction between the licit
and illicit marketplaces. 
Many law enforcement agencies that generally follow the ethnic-pluralist model
also recognize that organized crime is more commonly organized into loose net-
works rather than pyramidal monoliths (Europol, 2007). In Canada, law enforce-
ment observes that a sizable percentage of criminal networks re-group, merge with
other networks, or disband on a regular basis due to law enforcement intervention,
competition, and other pressures within the criminal marketplace (CISC, 2005, 2006,
2007, 2008, and 2009). Many of these networks also display a degree of flexibility or
resiliency to law enforcement’s efforts, adapting to the incarceration of members
or replacing those individuals (SOCA, 2009/10; Europol, 2007; and Nether lands Police
Agency, 2008). In the network model, organized crime echoes the multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural demographic nature of Canada. This stands in stark contrast to the
ethnic-pluralist model’s conception of ethnically homogenous networks seen as
“outsiders” to mainstream —i.e., Caucasian— Canadian society.
Adopting the Enterprise/Market Economic Models
The market and enterprise models explain how organized crime operates in the
licit and illicit marketplaces. These models emphasize the profit-oriented ration-
ality of criminal organizations (Halstead, 1998: 2).9 The illicit marketplace can be
understood as an economic network in which buyers, sellers, perpetrators, and vic-
tims interact to exchange goods and services consensually, or through deception or
force, and where the production, sale, and consumption of these goods and services
are forbidden or strictly regulated.10 Some criminal markets emerge when orga -
nized crime identifies and exploits loopholes in legal markets that then become
profitable market niches. Others, such as the markets for sex, drugs, and gambling,
have existed for centuries and have flourished outside state regulations.
The market model explains activities at the macro level of the industry (Halstead,
1998), focusing on the dynamics of the marketplace —both licit and illicit— at
the local, national, or global levels in terms of the supply, regulation, and compe-
tition of, as well as the demand for, goods and services. In this model, the criminal
9 While the great majority of organized crime groups operating in Canada are motivated by economic
gain, it is recognized that some organized crime networks may have other motivations behind their
illicit activities, such as a focus on territory or respect. 
10 This definition is influenced by a variety of works, particularly Arlacchi (1998).
marketplace does not operate separately from the legitimate economy, nor can clear
divisions be drawn between the so-called white and black economies. Actors move
between the markets, in and out of roles, expand or minimize their criminal activi-
ties in response to regulatory or competitive pressures, adjust to variations in mar-
ket demand and supply, and form short- and long-term mutually beneficial alliances.
Analysis of the inter-dependencies between the legal and illegal economies involves
working to “monitor and understand the market for illicit goods and services and
the impact of a changing legal and social environment that shapes patterns of pro-
duction, investment, and the interactions of organized criminals” (Mastrofski and
Potter, 1987: 286). 
The enterprise model focuses at the level of the criminal firm and details how
these organizations operate in licit and illicit sectors. It is based substantially on
Smith’s spectrum-based theory of enterprise in which “enterprise takes place across
a spectrum that includes both business and certain kinds of crime [and] behav-
ioral theory regarding organizations in general and business in particular can be
applied to the entire spectrum” (1980: 370).11 In the continuum of commercial
activities, there are paragon firms that operate licitly, pariah firms that operate in
the margins of legitimacy, and pirate firms that focus on illegality (379-383). The
dividing line between illegality and legality in this continuum is fine, and, as Smith
notes (372), can vary by industry and be redrawn with changes in regulation or
legislation. Organized crime networks can be simultaneously involved in multiple
activities across the continuum. 
The legitimate marketplace, its processes and structures, offer a lens through
which the similarities and differences of licit and illicit businesses can be assessed.
Though criminal capabilities and intentions vary widely, this model contends that
all enterprises on the licit-illicit continuum have similarities: they “typically scan
their environment for opportunities, seek to make rational judgments about oppor-
tunities and dangers, and seek to maximize their profits where this does not involve
unacceptably high levels of risk” (Williams and Godson, 2002: 324). 
There are limitations to the enterprise model, however, as there are key diffe -
ren ces between legitimate and illicit businesses. Naylor critiques the overall appli -
cation of a model of legitimate business to illicit enterprise stating that the model
represents “too facile an extension of free-market theory (with its assumptions of
open competition among equals and free information flows)” (1995: 39). In con-
trast to licit businesses, businesses operating in the criminal marketplace typically
keep layers of insulation between the illicit entrepreneur and the customer and
constrict information in order to deter competitors and regulators (e.g., law enfor ce-
ment) (Levi and Naylor, 2000; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987). Williams and Godson
(2002: 324) highlight the violence, intimidation, and corruption criminal networks
use as “business tools” and how they profit by concealing their operations. Levi and
Naylor (2000: 19-20) note that illicit businesses have little access to legal capital
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markets or legal protection of property rights, and, instead of brand loyalty, capi-
talize on personal loyalty.12
Despite these differences between legitimate and illicit businesses, this model
offers a useful framework through which to consider criminal networks’ interac-
tions with clients, regulators, collaborators, and competitors. This model is both
more nuanced (emphasizing the grey areas between licit and illicit behavior) and
comprehensive (addressing all aspects of illicit entrepreneurship) than law enfor -
cement’s traditional conception of organized crime.  
Proposal of a Hybrid Model
Organization- and activity-focused models have traditionally been regarded as
empirically different. Halstead (1998: 1) contends that the historic division be -
tween these types of models can be significantly narrowed, and, in some cases, the
models can be combined into hybrids. A hybrid model incorporating network and
market-enterprise models represents a fundamental shift from law enforcement’s
traditional narrow focus on criminal organizations to a dual focus: an organization-
focused analysis (network model) and an activity-focused analysis that assess orga-
nized crime’s operating environment (the licit and illicit marketplaces). This shift
will change how organized crime networks are identified and categorized, how
criminal intelligence is collected and collated, and how the networks are assessed
and prioritized by law enforcement. 
In the shift from ethnicity as the key organizing structure, organized crime is
no longer understood as a series of homogenous groupings of the “racialized” other,
but is instead depicted as small, flexible networks of individuals, including Cana -
dian-born nationals. This transformation demands that law enforcement personnel,
from the street-level officer to the specialized intelligence and enforcement units,
fundamentally change their vocabulary regarding organized crime. Organizational
changes should also occur, for example, re-naming units focused on certain eth-
nicities (e.g., Asian organized crime).
Information about an individual’s ethnicity or cultural/geographic origins that
contextualizes or is of some relevance to illicit activities or modus operandi will con-
tinue to be used to determine the criminal networks’ threats and vulnerabilities.
However, law enforcement should clearly separate relevant intelligence from obser-
vations of an individual’s race, ethnic origins, or cultural practices. For example, re -
levant cultural intelligence is when all criminal actors speak Russian on the phone
to thwart police wiretaps or advertisements for counterfeit goods are placed in
Chinese-language community newspapers in Toronto.
Law enforcement must make other adaptations when adopting the network
model. Bonds holding criminal networks together are not exclusively of kinship,
12 For a detailed discussion of the differences between legal and illegal firms, see Levi and Naylor (2000).
cul ture, or geographic origin. Individuals also establish bonds through shared
ex pe riences in neighborhoods, school, social or business interactions, or prison.
Further more, law enforcement should not assume hierarchical structure in crim-
inal organizations to be the norm but instead determine each network’s specific
organizing structures. 
The second component of the hybrid model is an activity-focused analysis of
organized crime’s environment. The market and enterprise models explicitly recog -
nize inter-dependencies between the licit and illicit economies and the mobility of
actors within and between these marketplaces. They require considering specific
illicit activities or commodities within the dynamics of the licit and illicit market-
places. Law enforcement often narrowly focuses on criminal actors and parti cular
illicit activities (e.g., cocaine trafficking) in a specific, localized area and may not fully
appreciate the broader context of the issue in terms of regional, national, or transna-
tio nal trends in demand and supply, distribution routes, and shifting legal and so -
cio-economic environments. 
Like the network model, the market and enterprise models emphasize the con -
sensual and entrepreneurial nature of the criminal marketplace in which there is
a free-market exchange of many illicit goods and services among producers, distri-
butors, and retailers on the supply side and, importantly, willing consumers on the
demand side (Naylor, 2003: 83). Criminal entrepreneurs are not regarded as cor-
rupting outsiders but rather “coequal partners involved in a symbiotic relationship”
(Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 269) with public officials and professionals. As a size-
able proportion of individuals desire some illicit goods and services, there can be
significant public support for and patronage of those markets (Wardlaw, 1989: 4).
Proposal of Risk Assessment Framework 
This article will now move from a critique of conceptual models to a discussion of
how Canadian law enforcement will practically apply the hybrid model to strength-
en its assessment of organized crime. It will be the theoretical foundation of a risk
assessment of organized crime and build upon existing risk assessment methodo -
logy (specifically, Albanese, 2008; Vander Beken, 2004; Black, Vander Beken, and
De Ruyver, 2000; and Black, Vander Beken, Frans, and Paternotte, 2001). Threat
assessments examine the nature and magnitude of specific threats that can pose
harm, while risk assessments examine the probability that an adverse event may
occur and determine the impact of that event in terms of extent and severity. 
Building upon the hybrid model’s dual focus on organization (criminal actors)
and activities (licit and illicit acts), the risk assessment will assess illicit organiza-
tions’ criminal capabilities and examine the illicit and licit activities they undertake
and the socio-economic environment in which they operate. A broad focus on orga-
nized crime’s operating environment, rather than a narrow focus on actors or spe-
cific groups, is contrary to the practice of most law enforcement agencies (Vander
Beken, 2004: 482). 
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Criminal Actors
Adoption of the network model formally replaces the traditional categorization of
organized crime by ethnic or cultural-geographical origin (e.g., Asian organized
crime) with a focus on individual criminal networks identified by the surname of a
principal member (e.g., MacKinnon, et al.). Network names may change as princi-
pal members enter and depart. However, name changes illustrate the fluidity within
social networks and require criminal intelligence units to gather network-specific
information regularly and effectively rather than relying on inaccurate concep-
tions of monolithic entities. Cultural intelligence (i.e., relevant ethnic or cultural/
geographic information) about criminal actors is of use to law enforcement; how-
ever, its pertinence must be established, not assumed.
Criminal networks should be understood as profit-oriented enterprises that con-
trol “the pressures they face from suppliers (sources), customers (demand), regu-
lators (law, police), and competitors (other legal and illegal businesses and products)”
(Albanese, 2008: 270). Analysis should focus on how legal and illegal actors work
together, determine the frequency, duration, and intensity of interactions, and assess
the benefits, risks, or crime-facilitative roles of legal actors (Passas, 2002: 15). 
A major component of risk analysis is a structured evaluation of criminal actors’
capabilities, intentions, limitations, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. These five
components, examined in concert, indicate the particular level of threat of an indi -
vidual or criminal group. A technique to measure the relative threat posed by orga-
nized criminal groups is the Sleipnir threat measurement technique. Created by
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Sleipnir uses a numerical rank-ordered set
of criminal attributes to assess each group’s capabilities (Strang, 2007). The sum of
the attributes results in an aggregate score for each criminal network. This score
(and accompanying analytical narrative) indicates the network’s threat level based
on its criminal capabilities and enables comparison among networks.
Canadian law enforcement undertakes an annual survey of criminal organiza-
tions: 800 in 2006, approximately 950 in 2007, about 900 in 2008, and about 750
in 2009 (CISC, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). The changes in these numbers over time
reflect a degree of fluidity in the criminal marketplace, disruptions by law enforce -
ment, changes in intelligence collection practices, or a combination of these fac-
tors. Sleipnir is used to assess the relative threat levels and compare threat levels
among groups and over time.
There are clear limitations to Sleipnir: the more that is known about a criminal
organization, the greater, in general, the Sleipnir score. Knowledge about particular
criminal actors or activities is greater where law enforcement has traditionally fo -
cused its efforts, such as illicit drugs or weapons, or highly visible criminal organi za-
tions like street gangs or outlaw motorcycle gangs. Sleipnir does not have a facility to
determine the negative consequences or “harm” of organized crime. Therefore, it
is unable to distinguish between a low-threat criminal network with a high-harm level
(e.g., an unsophisticated network whose indiscriminant use of violence endangers
the public) and a high-threat criminal network with a high-harm level (e.g., signi -
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ficant financial losses to thousands of victims from fraud). The first network can be
regarded as an immediate, public-safety risk that requires regular and intense but rel-
atively short-term enforcement action, while the latter could be determined to pose
a long-term economic risk. 
Operating Environment
The market/enterprise models form a theoretical framework for the activity-fo -
cused analysis of organized crime’s operating environment. The risk assessments
will focus on a systematic analysis of both illicit economic sectors (e.g., illicit drugs
or contraband goods) and licit economic sectors (e.g., the telecommunications
industry). The purpose of sector analysis is to determine the nature and extent of
organized crime in illicit and licit sectors, the vulnerability of specific sectors to orga -
nized crime, and, more importantly for decision-makers, where and when indictors
of organized criminality may appear next. Risk assessments focus on determining
high-risk illicit and licit sectors based on the nature and level of organized crime
involvement and/or their level of vulnerability to organized crime.  
Analysis will be divided into macro- and micro-level scans of illicit and licit sec -
tors to contextualize current risks and forecast future ones by identifying and assess-
ing indicators that enable (risk factor) or constrain (protective factor) organized
criminality. Macro analysis of sectors will identify not only intelligence gaps about
a specific sector but also indicators that, if analyzed correctly, should point to changes
within and between sectors as well as changes in risk over time (Vander Beken,
2004: 503; Albanese, 2008: 270). Analysis should also include an evaluation of
factors including new product opportunities, product dominance, profit margin, mar-
ket needs and opportunities, degree of competition, and risk management (Williams
and Godson, 2002: 324).
Once macro-level scan is complete, a micro-level scan of illicit sectors should
be undertaken. The scan of licit sectors should not begin with the automatic assump-
tion that organized crime is present as the sector may have attributes attractive to
criminal networks but not necessarily be vulnerable (Vander Beken, 2004: 504).
Of key importance within the licit scan is not only the examination of the nature
and extent that the licit industry in question intersects with illicit sectors but also
the persons in the legitimate marketplace who facilitate illicit activity, either inad-
vertently or by design.
This scan must be sensitive to “variations in supply, demand, regulation, and
com petition among localities and regions” and be undertaken separately for dif -
fe rent illicit products and industries as their comparative risk levels may differ
(Albanese, 2008: 271). This type of assessment can help determine the economic
conditions for each illicit market and consequently, gather specific information on
the nature, complexity, and magnitude of a network’s criminal operations in each
illicit sector.
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Conclusion
This article is a rejection of the traditional ethnic-pluralist and bureaucratic-hier-
archical models. But more importantly, it is a first step toward formalizing Cana dian
law enforcement’s fragmentary conceptualizations of organized crime. The hybrid
network and market/enterprise model represents a clear break with law enforce-
ment’s traditional conceptualizations of organized crime. Canadian law enforcement
shows some resistance to moving away from the pluralist and bureaucratic-hier-
archical models. The implementation of this model throughout the country requires
a shift in its institutional mindset. 
The formal adoption of the hybrid model will mark a sharp departure from typ-
ical practice, as law enforcement rarely explains publicly —much less defines
internally— how it views organized crime. As a result, the hybrid model will provide
a measure of transparency and accountability for law enforcement since it allows
for the articulation of its underlying assumptions about organized crime.
Law enforcement agencies often do not fully engage in dialogue or collaboration
with the wider community, in particular, academia, other government departments,
private sector, non-governmental agencies, and the public. This article is an attempt
to open a meaningful discussion with the wider community about the conceptu-
alization and measurement of organized crime.
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